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We explore the design of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms to solve hold-up problems in 
environmental regulation. Under Cournot competition, announcing the subsidy rate seems to 
be preferable to announcing the tax rate. Moreover, for constant marginal damage the hold-up 
problem can always be solved by setting subsidies. Under Bertrand competition, only 
announcing the tax rate can induce at least one firm to invest. We suggest that feebate systems 
in the automotive sector should be designed as self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms. 
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Self-¯nancing tax/subsidy mechanisms can be a powerful policy tool to spur
welfare-enhancing investments in oligopolies. Consider environmental reg-
ulation settings, where ¯rms can make costly investments in non-polluting
technologies. Firms may behave strategically by refusing to invest, saving
investment costs, and hoping to force the regulator to adopt looser regula-
tions. Self-¯nancing tax/subsidy mechanisms treat ¯rms alike, whether they
invest or not. If, however, one ¯rm invests and the other does not, the ¯rm
that does not comply must pay taxes, which are used in turn to subsidize the
complying ¯rm. This potentially creates a Prisoner's Dilemma for ¯rms, and
an equilibrium may exist in which all ¯rms invest to avoid subsidizing others.
The regulator can credibly trigger investments in emission reductions.
Hold-up problems are real-world phenomena. For instance, the standards
speci¯ed by the 1970 American Clean Air Act were repeatedly delayed. Most
dramatically, faced with industry claims that the proposed emission stan-
dards would shut down factories, Congress amended the Act in 1977, thus
both weakening and postponing the standards. Similarly, in 1988 the gov-
ernment delayed standards for the 1989 model year. Further evidence of the
hold-up problem can be found in Weimann (1995), who illustrates how the
"cartel of silence" on the part of engineers prevents the government from
imposing tighter regulations.
Another recent example illustrates credibility problems. In 1998, Congress
included a provision in the highway bill that delayed the ¯rst steps towards
bringing states into compliance with the Clean Air Act's long-standing goal
of "reasonable progress" toward eliminating man-made haze in specially pro-
tected areas for six to nine years. Until Congress intervened, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency had planned to ask states to ¯le preliminary plans
by 1999, showing how they would eventually raise visibility standards grad-
ually over the next few decades by complying with the new rules that had
been proposed two years earlier.1
Hold-up problems occur when an announced policy is not time consis-
tent and ¯rms behave accordingly. If ¯rms believe that the government
will loosen environmental policy or reduce the promotion of environmentally
1See New York Times, May 27, 1998.
2friendly technologies, they are likely to invest little in such technologies. For
instance, in 2002 the UK government thought about changing the rules on
the eligibility of co-¯ring biomass with coal. This change would reduce the
renewable obligation certi¯cate price and therefore reduce the pro¯tability
and the amount of investment in renewable energy production.2
We consider two models for self-¯nancing regulatory mechanisms when
hold-up problems are present. In the ¯rst one, two ¯rms produce homogenous
goods, have the possibility of investing in emission reduction, and compete
in the product market in a Cournot fashion. Our main results are as follows:
Under Cournot competition it is possible that the announcement of the
tax rate will yield the investment of all ¯rms, whereas the announcement of
the subsidy rate will not, and vice versa. If the emission damage is linear,
then the announcement of the subsidy rate will yield the investment of all
¯rms. Announcing the subsidy rate seems to be preferable to announcing
the tax rate if there is a hold-up problem.
In the second model, we consider Bertrand competition with homogenous
goods. Under Bertrand competition announcing the subsidy rate does not
work, whereas announcing the tax rate leads to an investment by one ¯rm.
It is not possible to induce both ¯rms to invest by using a self-¯nancing
mechanism.
Our mechanism might be applied as a feebate system in the automotive
sector to promote the sale of environmentally friendly cars. Feebates refer
generally to fees on fuel-ine±cient vehicles and rebates on fuel-e±cient ones.
A ¯rst option of a feebate-system is taxation of the purchase of cars that
exceed a certain emission level, and to refund the tax revenues to the buyers
of cleaner cars. A second option is the implementation of a feebate system at
the industry level, which would be equivalent to our tax/subsidy mechanism.
The production of environmentally friendly cars could be subsidized by using
the revenues from the taxation of the production of environmentally harmful
cars.
The revenue neutrality can be quite important in determining public opin-
ion and political support for feebates (see Bernow, 2002). Di®erent feebate-
systems have been tested in the automotive sector. One example of a widely
applied design of a feebate system were the German tax di®erentials for
2See DTI (2003) and Helm et al. (2003).
3catalytic converters and unleaded gasoline, which were implemented in 1986.
Cash subsidies, grants and a repayment for installation of catalytic converters
for the produced cars with analytic converters have been o®ered by the gov-
ernment, combined with taxes on leaded gasoline (see Bernow, 2002). Such
feebate schemes are generally not revenue-neutral. One of the strengths of
our mechanism is that it is revenue neutral by construction; no regulation
adjustment is needed.
One possible approach for the practical design of our mechanism for the
automotive industry is the following: Each car manufacturer has to pay a
certain tax rate for the sale of each environmentally harmful car in one period.
At the end of this period, the tax revenues are paid as a subsidy to the car
manufacturers in proportion to the amount of environmentally friendly cars
sold within that period, such that total tax revenues equal total subsidy
outlays. In other words, the subsidy rate is determined endogenously by the
self-¯nancing condition.3 In addition, one could allow for a di®erentiation
between di®erent categories of environmentally friendly and harmful cars and
accordingly, a di®erentiation of tax rates and subsidy rates. One would then
¯x the set of tax rates and the relative subsidy rates. The absolute level of the
subsidies would be determined endogenously by the self-¯nancing condition.
Train et al. mention possible feebate schedules which take into account the
level of environmental friendliness/harmfulness of the cars. One example is
a schedule which is linear in the miles per gallon.
Feebate systems can yield substantial emission reductions. In HLB (1999)
it is reported that a feebate system in the Canadian automobile market
could cut down greenhouse gas emissions by 33.95 mega-tones over a 22-year
period.4
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the re-
lated literature and section 3 develops the basic model. Section 4 describes
Cournot competition, while Section 5 describes Bertrand competition. Sec-
tion 6 is the conclusion.
3The tax revenues are simply refunded to the tax payers if no environmentally friendly
car was sold within the period.
4There are also other potential real world applications of tax/subsidy schemes.
Tax/subsidy schemes might be used to reduce the consumption of water and other re-
sources and as a way to improve the energy e±ciency of new buildings.
42 Relation to the Literature
Our paper relates to di®erent strands of literature. Gersbach (2002) has
suggested self-¯nancing tax/subsidy schemes in environmental regulation.
The recent paper contains three novel considerations. First, we de¯ne a
general tax/subsidy mechanism when ¯rms compete µ a la Cournot and hold-
up problems in environmental regulation are present. Second, we distinguish
between announcing the tax and the subsidy rate which turns out to be
important for the scope of the mechanism. Third, we develop tax/subsidy
mechanisms for Bertrand competition.
Additionally, our paper is related to the literature about the original
hold-up problem, where a ¯rm facing a single buyer may ¯nd investment
unpro¯table if, after making the investment, the buyer o®ers to pay only
marginal costs. This has been discussed in Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978), Joskow (1987), Williamson (1983), and in the incomplete-contract
literature (see the survey by Hart, 1995).
The idea that threats or promises by the government may not be cred-
ible has already been discussed in literature on trade protection (Staiger
and Tabellini, 1987, Matsuyama, 1990, Tornell, 1991), regulation of utilities
(Salant and Woroch, 1992, Gilbert and Newbery, 1994, Urbiztondo, 1994),
and privatization (Levy and Spiller, 1997). The hold-up problem is only
solvable if there are means which make governmental regulation credible. In
our paper, we design a credible self-¯nancing tax/subsidy scheme to spur
investments by ¯rms.
Our analysis also relates to mechanism design that uses the tools of multi-
stage games and subgame perfect equilibria (see Varian, 1994 or Moore, 1992
for a review of the literature). Our paper is an example of subgame perfect
implementation of environmental regulation.
Finally, our paper is related to work about the incentives to adopt clean
technologies in the design of environmental policy instruments. Milliman and
Prince (1989) and Jung, Krutilla and Boyd (1996) examine ¯rms' incentives
to invest in new technology, and provide a ranking of di®erent policy instru-
ments (see also La®ont and Tirole, 1996, Requate 1995). Recently, Requate
and Unold (2003) have established a precise hierarchy of policy instruments
when ¯rms have no impact on the level of environmental regulation. In our
5context, we examine incentives under tax/subsidy mechanisms to invest in
clean technologies when a ¯rm can in°uence the tightness of regulation by
its investment decision.
3 The Model
3.1 Firms and Welfare
We consider an industry with two ¯rms denoted by i = 1;2 producing a
homogeneous good. The marginal cost of production is c (c ¸ 0), and is
independent of the installation of abatement technology. The investment
decisions of ¯rms are denoted by Ii, i = 1;2 with
Ii =
(
K if ¯rm i invests




a if ¯rm i has not invested
0 if ¯rm i has invested (2)
denote emissions per unit of output depending on the investment decisions
of ¯rms. Firms can reduce the emissions per unit of output from a > 0 to
zero by investing a ¯xed amount of K in clean technologies. Not-investing
¯rms therefore are also called polluting ¯rms, while investing ¯rms are also
called clean or not polluting ¯rms. We denote by
E = a1q1 + a2q2 (3)
the resulting total amount of emissions, where qi denotes the output of ¯rm
i.
Q = q1 + q2 (4)
is the industry's output. Social welfare depends on consumer surplus S(Q),
on producer surplus net of investment costs P(Q), on investment outlays
I1+I2 and on the social costs of emissions D(E). D(E) is the social damage
in terms of willingness to pay. Therefore, social welfare, as denoted by W, is
given by
W = S(Q) + P(Q) ¡ I1 ¡ I2 ¡ D(E). (5)
6A number of comments are necessary here. Our central assumption is
that ¯rms cannot be punished directly for not investing. It is impossible
for the government to force ¯rms to invest by penalizing non-investing ¯rms
¯nancially, or by closing them down. As discussed at length in the literature
on incomplete contracts (see Hart (1995) for a survey), even when invest-
ments are observable, they are not veri¯able in courts, and hence penalties
directly dependent on investment behavior are not feasible. This is the case,
for example, when investment in clean technologies is a by-product of other
investments, or when investment requires certain types of human capital for
implementation. In the latter case, ¯rms can always claim that they are not
able to generate the full bene¯ts of an investment. A clear example of non-
veri¯able investments are R&D e®orts. Our model is applicable to R&D,
where the success probability is high. In our case this probability is assumed
for convenience to be one.
Although the regulator is unable to directly regulate the adoption of clean
technology, he can levy taxes on ¯rms that have high emissions and can pay
subsidies to ¯rms with low emissions per unit. Hence, taxes and subsidies
can be made contingent on emissions per unit of output and therefore indi-
rectly on investment in less polluting technologies. Finally, we note that the
regulator can commit to using a certain framework for environmental regula-
tion. In particular, we assume that the regulator is constrained to use taxes
and subsidies in regulation emissions. Other regulatory frameworks such as
permit markets are excluded.5 This assumption is justi¯ed by the time a
regulator needs to develop a regulatory framework. Once such a framework
has been developed and has become law, it commits a regulator for a certain
time. The actual level of taxes or subsidies, however, can be adjusted fre-
quently and we assume precisely that the regulator will adjust tax or subsidy
rates in order to maximize social welfare.
We assume that the regulator maximizes social welfare given in equation
(5). Hence, the regulator does not pursue revenue objectives in order to focus
on solving hold-up problems. In turn, our self-¯nancing constraint ensures
that no funds from the government budget are needed. The tax/subsidy
mechanism below could be adapted to include revenue objectives by consid-
ering the shadow costs of taxation in the economy. The scope for solving the
5The role of permit markets in solving hold-up problems is discussed in Gersbach and
Glazer (1999).
7hold-up problem would, however, decrease. Third, our model set-up is very
simple. In the ¯nal section, we comment on the robustness of our conclu-
sions with respect to the availability of completely clean technologies and to
uncertainty.
Before introducing the tax/subsidy mechanism we note that the regulator
pursues goals which might be competing. In order to generate strong invest-
ment incentives, polluting ¯rms should face a tight regulation. On the other
hand, the regulation should limit product market distortions which calls for
soft regulation.
3.2 The Tax/Subsidy Mechanism
We consider the following four-stage regulatory tax/subsidy mechanism:
² Stage 1: The government commits to using the following self-¯nancing
tax/subsidy scheme:
Table 1:
(i) Both ¯rms pollute Emissions tax ¿
(ii) One ¯rm pollutes Subsidy to the clean ¯rm, ¯nanced
by the taxation of the polluting ¯rm
(tax/subsidy rule)
(iii) No ¯rm pollutes No taxes or subsidies
If both ¯rms pollute, the regulator passes on the gains from taxation
as a lump-sum transfer to the consumers. If only one ¯rm pollutes,
the tax/subsidy rule is used, and we have: The clean ¯rm is subsidized
by s, which denotes the subsidy per unit of product sold, while the
polluting ¯rm is taxed by t, which denotes the emission tax per unit
of product sold. The regulator has two choices. He can announce a
subsidy rate denoted by sann, or he can announce a tax rate denoted
by tann. To describe subsidization and taxation, suppose that ¯rm 1
does not pollute and ¯rm 2 does. Then, the regulation of the two
possible scenarios is as follows:
81. The regulator announces the subsidy rate sann: Net pro¯ts ¦1 and




2;0gg=q2 if q2 > 0
0 else (6)




2=q1;0gg if q1 > 0
0 else , (7)
whereby ¦¤
2 denotes the second ¯rm's pretax net pro¯t (the net
pro¯t without consideration of tax payment tq2). By these rules
the regulator always ensures that the self-¯nancing condition (the
gains from taxation equal the subsidy outlays) is ful¯lled in all
circumstances, that is, any combination of q1, q2 and sann. There-
fore there are no incentives for ¯rm 2 to attempt to violate the
self-¯nancing condition. If the implementation of sann would vi-
olate the self-¯nancing condition, given the production quantities
q1 and q2, rules (6) and (7) would lead to a downward adjustment
of s and t until the self-¯nancing condition is ful¯lled.
2. The regulator announces the tax rate tann: Net pro¯ts ¦1 and ¦2





2=q2;0gg if q2 > 0
0 else (8)




2;0gg=q1 if q1 > 0
0 else (9)
whereby ¦¤
2 again denotes the second ¯rm's pretax net pro¯t. As
before, rules (8) and (9) provide for the ful¯llment of the self-
¯nancing condition.
² Stage 2: Firms decide whether or not to invest in emissions reduction.
² Stage 3: The government uses the tax/subsidy scheme and sets ¿ or
sann or tann.
9² Stage 4: Firms compete and produce.6
In the following, we study the tax/subsidy mechanism for Cournot-type
competition. Our key question is: Should the regulator announce the subsidy
or the tax rate in the tax/subsidy mechanism to solve the hold-up problem?
4 Cournot Competition
We assume that the ¯rms stand in Cournot competition, and choose their
production quantities q1 ¸ 0 and q2 ¸ 0. The inverse demand function is
given by
p(Q) = 1 ¡ bQ. (10)
b is a positive constant. Marginal costs c are assumed to be lower than
1 and nonnegative, otherwise production would not take place. Therefore
production costs of ¯rm i (i 2 f1;2g) are given by cqi.
Note that the total tax burden of the non-investing ¯rm is of a lump-
sum nature, given the subsidy rate sann, the production quantity of the ¯rm
investing, and given that the pro¯t of the non-investing ¯rm exceeds or equals
the tax burden.
To keep the model simple, we assume as a tie-breaking rule that a ¯rm
will choose the highest production quantity if it has more than one optimal
alternative.
4.1 Standard Emission Taxation
In real world environmental problems, the emissions taxation is a very pop-
ular instrument. In this section, we suppose that the regulator imposes
emissions taxes on the output. The tax rate is of the welfare-maximizing
kind and depends on the number of ¯rms polluting. The gross pro¯t (prod-
uct market pro¯t) of ¯rm i is denoted by ¼
I1I2
i , where I1 and I2 respectively
denote the investment decisions by the ¯rst and the second ¯rm. Similarly,
6Each ¯rm is allowed to exit.
10the production quantity of ¯rm i is denoted by q
I1I2
i . We now consider each
case in turn.
First, let us suppose that no ¯rm has invested. The optimal tax rate is
denoted by t0 and can be zero or positive. The tax revenues are distributed
to consumers as a lump-sum transfer. The pro¯t of ¯rm i (i 2 f1;2g) is
denoted by ¼00















1 ¡ c ¡ t0
3b
, (12)
whereby t0 2 [0;1 ¡ c]. q00

































Second, suppose one ¯rm (say ¯rm 1) has invested, while the other has
not. In this case, the regulator again sets an emission tax per unit of output,
if this output generates emissions. We denote the welfare-optimizing tax rate
in this case by tK, which will only be applied to polluting output, and thus
only to ¯rm 2.7 tK is situated in the interval [0; 1¡c
2 ]. Accordingly, production






















(1 ¡ c ¡ 2tK)2
9b
. (16)
The regulator has to choose tK 2 [0; 1¡c



















2 ¡ K ¡ D(aq
K0
2 ). (17)
7There are no tax payments for ¯rm 1 since it does not cause emissions.
11Third, suppose that both ¯rms have invested. Then, since no emissions
are generated, the emission tax is zero. In this case production quantities

















Now we are in a position to formulate the hold-up problem. In an in-
termediate step, we characterize a situation, which is called "optimal full
investment".





is denoted by "optimal full investment" (OFI). Wn denotes the social welfare
if n ¯rms have invested, and emissions are taxed optimally.
Therefore, OFI exists if the following two statements are ful¯lled. The
¯rst condition simply states that investment yields higher pro¯ts than exiting.
Additionally, it is socially desirable in an emission taxation regime for both
¯rms to invest. This is realized in the second condition.





















Thereore, the hold-up problem exists if the investment of both ¯rms is
not an equilibrium under the standard emissions taxation in OFI.
12Note that our de¯nition is in the spirit of the traditional hold-up prob-
lem concerning the buyer/seller relationship, when the initial investor does
not reap all bene¯ts from his investment, and thus investment is below the
socially desired level.
In the next section, we examine how ¯rms can be induced to invest if
HUP (or OFI) holds.
4.2 The Tax/Subsidy Mechanism with the Announce-
ment of the Subsidy Rate
We ¯rst examine the case in which the regulator uses the tax/subsidy mech-
anism, and announces the subsidy rate.
4.2.1 Only One Firm Invests
We consider the case when only one ¯rm (say ¯rm 1) has invested. The
subsidy rate sann is announced. According to the de¯nition, s = sann holds if
the second ¯rm is able to pay the tax burden implied by sann. To simplify the
exposition, we assume that the regulator only announces subsidy rates that,
if implemented, would not violate the self-¯nancing condition given ¯rms
equilibrium reactions to the announced rates.8 Note that the second ¯rm
will not try to violate the self-¯nancing condition as long as its net pro¯t,
denoted by ¦2, is nonnegative.9 Therefore we restrict ourselves to the case
s = sann.10 The self-¯nancing condition implies
sq1 = tq2. (21)





Remember that the total tax burden of the second ¯rm tq2 = sq1 is of a
lump-sum nature, given the values of s and q1.
8This does not a®ect our results, since higher subsidy rates would be adjusted accord-
ingly until self-¯nancing holds.
9For details of the second ¯rm's behaviour, see proof of proposition 1 in the appendix.
10In all cases we will have ¦2 ¸ 0.
13The net pro¯ts are given by
¦1 = (1 ¡ bQ ¡ c + s)q1 ¡ K, ¦2 = (1 ¡ bQ ¡ c)q2 ¡ sq1, (23)
whereby ¦1 denotes the net pro¯t of the ¯rst ¯rm. It is straightforward to
demonstrate that in order to maximize pro¯ts ¯rms will choose the following
quantities:
q1 =
1 ¡ c + 2s
3b
; q2 =
1 ¡ c ¡ s
3b
(24)
Therefore, 0 · s · 1 ¡ c must hold. The resulting net pro¯ts for the two
¯rms are
¦1 =
(1 ¡ c + 2s)2
9b
¡ K; ¦2 =
1 ¡ c(2 ¡ c) ¡ 5(1 ¡ c)s ¡ 5s2
9b
. (25)









q1 < 0 (26)
We denote the subsidy rate 3
p
5¡5
10 (1 ¡ c) by s¤. This is the highest possible




10 < 1. The regulator will not announce a higher subsidy rate than s¤
since ¦2(s¤) becomes negative otherwise. Therefore s has to be situated in
the interval [0;s¤]. The ¯rst ¯rm becomes a monopolist for a higher s than














¡ K, ¦2 = 0. (28)
We next investigate the welfare-optimizing subsidy. The sum of consumer













This sum is monotonically increasing in s, since











q2 > 0 8s 2 [0;s
¤] . (30)
The social damage of emissions D(E) is monotonically increasing in E,






< 0 8s 2 [0;s
¤] . (31)













Therefore, the corner solution s = s¤ maximizes social welfare, and the reg-
ulator should announce s = s¤.
4.2.2 Equilibria
We next derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the four-stage game which,
because of the property @W
@s > 0, must necessarily involve s = s¤ if one ¯rm
invests and the other does not. An equilibrium is characterized by I1, I2,
q1, q2 and possibly ¿ or s. The investment decisions Ii and the production
quantities qi are observable for sure. The regulator has to announce ¿, which
denotes the tax rate if no ¯rm has invested, in the case of I1 = I2 = 0; he
has to announce s in the case of I1 6= I2.
In the appendix we show:




1. There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
µ







0, s = s
¤.
















the subsidy rate solves the hold-up problem. Solving HUP means that the
regulation yields I1 = I2 = K in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Intuitively, if a ¯rm deviates by Ii = 0 it will encounter zero pro¯ts, because
it is credible for the regulator to implement s¤, and to impose taxes on the
deviating ¯rm such that its pro¯ts become zero. In the unique equilibrium,
the regulator has to impose neither taxes nor subsidies and both ¯rms invest.
The emissions are zero and the production quantities q1 and q2 are the same
as without regulation. Hence, there are no product market distortions due
to regulation. We next investigate the announcement of the tax rate.
4.3 The Tax/Subsidy Mechanism with the Announce-
ment of the Tax Rate
4.3.1 Only One Firm Invests
Again we start with the case where the ¯rst ¯rm is the only ¯rm investing.
The tax rate tann for ¯rm 2 is announced. To simplify the exposition we as-
sume that the regulator announces the lowest tax rate tann, if he is indi®erent
to varying taxes.11 Note that the second ¯rm will choose q2 such that ¦2 ¸ 0,
given tann, because it can always ensure ¦2 = 0 by setting q2 = 0. Thus we






11The regulator is indi®erent to di®erent tax rates, if the product market outcome and
subsidy and tax levels are identical.
16Now, given t and choice q2, the overall subsidies tq2 are of a lump-sum
nature for the ¯rst ¯rm. Therefore net pro¯ts are given by
¦1 = (1 ¡ bQ ¡ c)q1 + tq2 ¡ K, ¦2 = (1 ¡ bQ ¡ c ¡ t)q2. (34)
The unique Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game yields
q1 =
1 ¡ c + t
3b
; q2 =
1 ¡ c ¡ 2t
3b
, (35)
where t is situated in the interval [0; 1¡c
2 ]. This leads to the following net
pro¯ts:
¦1 =
(1 ¡ c)2 + 5(1 ¡ c)t ¡ 5t2
9b
¡ K; ¦2 =
(1 ¡ c ¡ 2t)2
9b
. (36)













The tax rate 1¡c
2 , denoted by t¤, is the smallest tax rate that yields ¦2 = 0.
Since the announcement of a tax rate higher than t¤ yields the same outcome
as the announcement of t¤, the regulator announces t¤ if social welfare is








¡ K, ¦2 = 0. (39)
Therefore when t = t¤ the investing ¯rm essentially becomes a monopolist
and no emissions occur.
Again we examine how social welfare depends on t. The sum of consumer









(1 ¡ c)2 + 5(1 ¡ c)t ¡ 5t2 + (1 ¡ c ¡ 2t)2
9b
(40)









q1 < 0 8 t 2 [0;t
¤]. (41)
17The social damage of emissions D(E) is monotonically increasing in E






< 0 8 t 2 [0;t
¤]. (42)











> 0 8t 2 [0;t
¤], (43)

















We call condition (45) the large marginal damage (LMD) assumption.
It may occur that @W


















In this case, the regulator will choose t = 0 if one ¯rm has invested since
welfare losses from product-market distortions dominate welfare losses from
emissions. We call condition (47) the small marginal damage (SMD) as-
sumption.
4.3.2 Equilibria
Now we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the four-stage game. An
equilibrium is now characterized by I1, I2, q1, q2, and possibly ¿ or t. The
regulator will announce the tax rate t = t¤ if, in the case of I1 6= I2,
@W
@t
¸ 0 8 t 2 [0;t
¤]. (48)
18In the appendix we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume OFI and LMD.
1. There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
µ







0, t = t
¤.











Proposition 2 indicates that announcing the tax rate in the OFI situation
will yield the investment of both ¯rms as long as LMD is ful¯lled. But, as
indicated in the next proposition, LMD is never ful¯lled when HUP holds.
Proposition 3 LMD is violated if HUP holds.
The proof of proposition 3 is given in the appendix. Proposition 3 indi-
cates that the regulator supposedly has to announce a smaller tax rate than
t¤ if HUP holds. If the marginal damage of emissions is so severe that LMD
is ful¯lled, then the standard emission taxation and the tax/subsidy mech-
anism, with the announcement of the tax rate, yield the investment of both
¯rms.
In contrast to subsidies, there are instances where the credible tax rate
is zero if one ¯rm has invested. The reason stems from the asymmetric
reactions of ¯rms to self-¯nancing subsidies and tax rates. In the former
19case, subsidies for the investing ¯rm drive the pro¯t, but not the output12, of
the non-investing ¯rm to zero. In contrast, announcing t¤ reduces the pro¯t
and the output of the non-investing ¯rm to zero. Therefore, using tax rates
makes product-market distortions more severe than using subsidies. This
may induce the regulator to implement t = 0, if the marginal damage of
emissions is not too high.
4.4 Announcement of Taxes or Subsidies?
In the next step, we compare subsidy and tax announcement. Comparing
propositions 1 and 2 immediately yields
Proposition 4 Assume OFI. Then,13
1. if K < 9
5¼KK
1 ¡ ¼00
1 and LMD holds, announcing the subsidy rate (s¤)
or the tax rate (t¤) uniquely implements I1 = I2 = K.
2. if K < 9
5¼KK
1 ¡ ¼00
1 and SMD holds, announcing the subsidy rate (s¤)
uniquely implements I1 = I2 = K, whereas announcing the tax rate
does not.
3. if K > 9
5¼KK
1 ¡ ¼00
1 and LMD holds, announcing the tax rate (t¤)
uniquely implements I1 = I2 = K, whereas announcing the subsidy
rate does not.
4. if K > 9
5¼KK
1 ¡¼00
1 and SMD holds, announcing the subsidy rate or the
tax rate does not uniquely implement I1 = I2 = K.
Proposition 4 indicates that announcing the subsidy rate has the advan-
tage that s¤ is always credible.
There are situations in which investment by both ¯rms is socially optimal,
but the credible tax rate t is zero (see Example 1). However, announcing
subsidy rates generates fewer pro¯ts from investment than announcing tax






13Moreover all standard examples with linear or quadratic damage functions ful¯ll the
cases 1, 2 or 4. We have not found an example yet to support case 3.
20rates if I1 6= I2. That is why announcing tax rates can uniquely induce




the announcement of the subsidy rate also yields investment by both ¯rms
for all investment costs that ful¯ll OFI (in particular: K < ¼KK
1 ). t0 is




1 holds if t0 is at least 1 ¡ 2 p
5.
However, even if announcing the subsidy or the tax rate uniquely im-
plement I1 = I2 = K, and yield equal equilibrium welfare, some important
di®erences in out-of-equilibrium behavior remain. These are summarized in
proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Assume OFI, K < 9
5¼KK
1 ¡ ¼00
1 and LMD. If I1 6= I2, then
1. emissions are higher under s¤ than under t¤; in particular, announcing
t¤ leads to zero emissions.
2. the sum of consumer and producer surplus under s¤ is higher than under
t¤.
The proof of proposition 5 is given in the appendix. Again, the asym-
metric reactions of investing and non-investing ¯rms to subsidy or tax an-
nouncements explain the result:
² Both announcing the tax rate and announcing the subsidy rate raises
the production volume of the investing ¯rm at the expense of the non-
investing ¯rm.
² Announcing the tax rate lowers the aggregate production volume whereas
announcing the subsidy rate raises the aggregate production volume.
s¤ does not a®ect the quantity choice of the non-investing ¯rm (say ¯rm 1)
directly since s¤q1 is of a lump-sum nature for ¯rm 2. But s¤ directly raises
the production quantity of the ¯rm investing. Taxation creates di®erent
e®ects. t¤ has no direct in°uence on the quantity choice of the investing
¯rm, whereas it has in°uence on the quantity choice of the non-investing
¯rm.
21Note that the use of the tax/subsidy mechanism is only better than no
regulation in terms of social welfare, if the emission reduction potential of
the abatement technology is high enough in comparison with the investment
costs.
4.5 The Linear Case and an Example
In this section we discuss the linear case in more detail and obtain the re-
markable result that for D(E) = dE with d > 0 the hold-up problem is
always solvable.
At ¯rst we calculate the tax rates t0 and tK of the standard emission-
















(1 ¡ c + tK)2 + (1 ¡ c ¡ 2tK)2
9b
¡ K.
The ¯rst order condition yields the interior solution of tK:
@W
@tk =




K = 6ad ¡ (1 ¡ c) (51)






0 if ad · 1¡c
6







2 if ad ¸ 1¡c
4
. (52)













´ 1 ¡ c ¡ t0
3b
+ 2
(1 ¡ c ¡ t0)2
9b
. (53)
The interior solution of t0 is calculated as follows:
@W
@t0 =





3ad ¡ (1 ¡ c)
2
(55)






0 if ad · 1¡c
3
3ad¡(1¡c)
2 if ad 2
³
1¡c
3 ;1 ¡ c
´
1 ¡ c if ad ¸ 1 ¡ c
(56)
In the appendix we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Assume HUP and D(E) = dE with d > 0. Then, announc-
ing the subsidy rate s¤ uniquely implements I1 = I2 = K.
Proposition 6 indicates that if marginal damage is constant, the hold-
up problem can always be solved by the tax/subsidy mechanism with the
announcement of s¤. In the next step we provide an example which illustrates
proposition 6.
Example 1 D(E) = E, a = 1
10, c = 0, K = 1
100b
First, we derive t0. From (56) follows
t












Next, we derive tK. We calculate tK by using equation (52):
t
K = 0 (59)
The production quantities q00
1 and qK0
1 are the same as qKK
1 , because the two
tax rates t0 and tK are zero.
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2 g = 0
23Moreover, the credible tax rate (of the tax/subsidy mechanism with the



































Therefore both ¯rms will invest if the regulator announces s¤. But if the reg-
ulator announces the credible tax rate, no ¯rm will invest. Thus the regulator
must announce s¤.
5 Bertrand Competition
In this section we examine Bertrand competition. Using the standard frame-
work, assume that the two ¯rms respectively choose their prices, denoted by
p1 and p2. Consumers only buy the product from the ¯rm with the lower
price. If the prices of both ¯rms are equal, both ¯rms receive half of the total
demand. To simplify the exposition, we again assume a tie-breaking rule: A
¯rm will choose to stay in the market, if it is indi®erent between exiting and
staying in the market.
5.1 Self-¯nancing Mechanism with Two Firms Invest-
ing
Due to the standard Bertrand result, without regulatory intervention, ¯rms
make zero gross pro¯t in the fourth stage, independent of the investment de-
cisions in the second stage. Therefore, no ¯rm will invest without regulation.
Thus, with regulation via tax/subsidy mechanisms, price competition with
homogeneous products cannot induce both ¯rms to invest. This is, of course,
also the case under standard emission taxation. If both ¯rms have invested,
gross product-market pro¯ts are zero in the fourth stage, thus the net pro¯ts
are negative since neither taxes nor subsidies apply. A ¯rm can then avoid
negative pro¯ts by not investing. We summarize this simple observation in
the following proposition.
24Proposition 7 There exists no self-¯nancing mechanism (and no mecha-
nism with revenues) that yields I1 = I2 = K.
However, it is possible to induce investment by one ¯rm via tax/subsidy
mechanisms. This will be discussed in the next subsection.
5.2 Self-¯nancing Mechanism with Only One Firm In-
vesting
We denote the total demand, the ¯rst ¯rm's demand and the second ¯rm's
demand by N, N1 and N2 respectively.
We consider ¯rst the fourth stage. Assume momentarily I1 = K 6= I2.
Assume also that the regulator uses the tax/subsidy mechanism with the
announcement of tax rate tann. Again the regulator is assumed to announce
the lowest tax rate if di®erent tax rates are optimal with respect to the
maximization of W. Note that ¯rm 2 will choose p2 such that ¦2 ¸ 0, given
tann, because it can always ensure ¦2 = 0 by setting p2 such that N2 = 0. As
a consequence, we have tann = t if both ¯rms choose their equilibrium prices.
The net pro¯ts are given by
¦1 = (p1 ¡ c)N1 + tN2 ¡ K; ¦2 = (p2 ¡ c ¡ t)N2. (63)
Suppose that industry pro¯ts (p ¡ c)N(p) have a unique maximum at
the monopoly price pm, and are monotonically increasing in p for all p 2 [c;
pm].14 Suppose further that
0 · t · p
m ¡ c: (64)
We obtain:
Lemma 1 There exists a unique equilibrium in stage 4, if the regulator an-
nounces the tax rate t:
p1 = p2 = c + t
N1 = N2 =
N(c + t)
2
¦1 = tN(c + t) ¡ K; ¦2 = 0
14If N(p) is di®erentiable, the assumption is equivalent to the elasticity condition ¯ ¯(p¡c)@N(p)=@p
N(p)
¯ ¯ < 1.
25The proof of lemma 1 is given in the appendix. The important point
of lemma 1 is that, even if one ¯rm is taxed, both ¯rms produce under the
tax/subsidy mechanism. By taking into account the induced subsidies, the
¯rst ¯rm does not want to undercut the second ¯rm by its price setting. The
following very simple example illustrates the economic forces at work.
Example 2 N = 1 ¡
p
10
The monopoly price is
p




Assume that the ¯rst ¯rm is the only ¯rm investing. In equilibrium, pro¯t of
the ¯rst ¯rm is denoted by ¦
EQU










If the ¯rst ¯rm deviates and undercuts the second ¯rm with p1 = c + t ¡ ",
its pro¯t is denoted by ¦DEV
1 and given by
¦
DEV
1 = (t ¡ ")
µ
1 ¡






1 is at least as high as ¦DEV
1 if




which is ful¯lled if
0 · t · p
m ¡ c. (69)
The situation is quite di®erent if subsidies are announced. Assume now
the regulator uses the tax/subsidy mechanism with the announcement of the
subsidy rate sann. For any realized subsidy rate s, the net pro¯ts of the two
¯rms are then given by
¦1 = (p1 ¡ c + s)N1 ¡ K; ¦2 = (p2 ¡ c)N2 ¡ sN1. (70)
We obtain:
26Lemma 2 The implemented subsidy rate s is always zero.
The proof of lemma 2 is given in the appendix. The important di®erence
in comparison with the announcement of the tax rate is that subsidies cannot
be used by the regulator to achieve investment by one ¯rm. The non-investing
¯rm can either undercut the other ¯rm and avoid subsidies, or it can make
zero pro¯ts, which leads to s = 0 as well.
We next examine the overall game. Proposition 8 contains the main
results.
Proposition 8 1. Assume K < (pm ¡ c)N(pm), and that the regulator
announces the tax rate. Then, there exist tax rates t · pm¡c such that
the unique equilibrium in stage 2 is I1 6= I2.
2. No equilibrium with I1 6= I2 exists under the announcement of subsidies.
The proof of proposition 8 is given in the appendix. Proposition 8 indi-
cates that the regulator has to announce a tax rate t larger than K
N(c+t) and
smaller than pm ¡ c if he wants one ¯rm to invest. The social welfare max-
imizing tax rate, denoted by t¤, balances bene¯ts and costs in the following
way. Suppose that I1 6= I2. Increasing t in ] K
N(c+t); pm ¡ c] implies lower-
ing output Q = N(c + t) and lowering emissions E =
N(c+t)
2 . This causes
a decline in consumer surplus and emission damage. It also causes higher
producer surplus, since tN(c+t)¡K is increasing in t for all t · pm ¡c. t¤
balances environmental and output distortions.
6 Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that announcing the subsidy rate is preferable to an-
nouncing the tax rate if competition is soft, i.e. ¯rms compete in quantities.
The opposite is true if competition is ¯erce, i.e. ¯rms compete in prices.
We suggest that self-¯nancing tax/subsidy mechanisms might be applied as
feebate systems in the automotive industry.
Our analysis can be extended in several ways. To begin with, we have
assumed that investment in clean technologies can reduce emissions to zero.
27A more general feature would be the assumption that the emissions per unit
of output of a ¯rm investing are aI and of a non-investing ¯rm are aNI
(aI < aNI). One can verify, very tediously, that our results under Cournot
competition are qualitatively the same, as long as 2aI < aNI. For 2aI ¸ aNI,
which describes a situation where emission reductions through investments
are low, there is, however, no guarantee that s¤ is the credible subsidy rate.
The reason for that result is that the emissions E are monotonically increas-
ing (¯x) in s if 2aI > aNI (2aI = aNI). Hence, announcing s¤ remains
optimal as long as investments lead to substantial reduction in emissions.
Further, announcing the tax rate has one additional advantage, not present
in our model, over announcing the subsidy rate. When setting taxes or sub-
sidies, regulators may have to cope with signi¯cant uncertainty. Suppose
the regulator announces a slightly higher subsidy rate than s¤, or a slightly
higher tax rate than t¤ under Cournot competition. As discussed earlier in
this paper, in the case of subsidies this requires that the implemented rate is
lower than the announced rate, whereas an announced tax rate higher than
t¤ has no additional e®ect and could be implemented. Therefore, announcing
the tax rate seems to be less dependent on small uncertainty than announcing
the subsidy rate.
Overall, the tax/subsidy scheme appears to be a viable regulation mecha-
nism to achieve socially desirable investments by ¯rms supplementary to the
standard tools in environmental regulation.
287 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We show existence and uniqueness by working backwards.
1. Stage 4
Both ¯rms choose their production quantities.
(a) Both ¯rms have invested:






; i = 1;2. (71)
(b) Neither ¯rm has invested:





1 ¡ c ¡ ¿
3b
; i = 1;2. (72)
(c) One ¯rm (say ¯rm 1) has invested:
As discussed in subsection 4.2.1, the ¯rms choose
q1 =
1 ¡ c + 2s
3b
; q2 =




The regulator chooses ¿ or s to maximize social welfare. His decision
depends on the investment decisions of the ¯rms.
(a) Both ¯rms have invested:
No taxes or subsidies are imposed, since there are no emissions.
(b) Neither ¯rm has invested:
The regulator maximizes social welfare by imposing the emission
tax ¿ = t0.
29(c) One ¯rm (say ¯rm 1) has invested:
It has been shown in subsection 4.2.1 that the regulator maximizes
social welfare by announcing the subsidy rate s = s¤.
3. Stage 2
The ¯rms decide whether to invest. We consider the ¯rst ¯rm's decision.





if it invests. In the case of no investment, ¯rm 1 obtains
¦1 =
(1 ¡ c ¡ t0)2
9b
. (75)
(b) Suppose I2 = K. The pro¯t of the ¯rst ¯rm is
¦1 = ¼
KK




if it invests. If it does not invest, its pro¯t amounts to
¦1 = 0. (77)
Note that there are no incentives to deviate from this equilibrium
in order to violate the self-¯nancing condition by lowering q1, given
s¤ is ¯xed, since then taxation occurs at the maximum possible
level (¦1 = 0). The ¯rst ¯rm is indi®erent between q1 = 1¡c+2s
3b
and a smaller q1. As we have assumed with the tie-breaking rule
in section 4, in this situation the ¯rst ¯rm will choose the highest
possible quantity, which is q1 = 1¡c+2s
3b .


















The subgame perfect equilibrium is unique, hence the ¯rst point is shown.
The second point has been established in subsection 4.2.1.
307.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Again we establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium by working
backwards.
1. Stage 4
Both ¯rms choose their production quantities.







; i = 1;2. (78)
(b) Neither ¯rm has invested:




1 ¡ c ¡ ¿
3b
; i = 1;2. (79)
(c) One ¯rm (say ¯rm 1) has invested:
As discussed in subsection 4.3.1, ¯rms choose the production quan-
tities
q1 =
1 ¡ c + t
3b
; q2 =




The regulator chooses ¿ and t to maximize social welfare. The only
di®erence to the subsidy announcement is the case I1 6= I2, where it
has been shown in subsection 4.3.1 that the regulator maximizes social
welfare by announcing the tax rate t = t¤ if LMD holds.
3. Stage 2
The ¯rms decide whether to invest. Suppose LMD. We consider the
¯rst ¯rm's decision:






31If it does not invest, its pro¯t amounts to
¦1 =
(1 ¡ c ¡ t0)2
9b
. (82)
(b) Suppose I2 = K. The pro¯t of the ¯rst ¯rm is
¦1 = ¼
KK




if it invests. In the case of no investment, its pro¯t is
¦1 = 0. (84)














(1 ¡ c ¡ t0)2
9b
. (85)
Therefore, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique, which establishes the
¯rst point. The second point has been shown in subsection 4.3.1.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The credible tax rate of the tax/subsidy mechanism (t) equals the tax rate
of the standard-emission-taxation tax rate in the case of I1 6= I2 (tk). The
reason for this is that the ¯rst order conditions of welfare maximization with






















Suppose t = t¤ = 1¡c
2 . From t = tk follows tk = 1¡c
















1 g = ¼
KK
1 , (87)
which does not ful¯ll HUP. Therefore t has to be smaller than t¤ and LMD
cannot hold.
327.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose OFI, K < 9
5¼KK
1 ¡¼00
1 , LMD and I1 6= I2. The credible tax (subsidy)
rate is t¤ (s¤).
If the regulator announces the tax (subsidy) rate, the resulting emissions
are denoted by Et (Es) and given by







which illustrates the ¯rst part. The sum of consumer and producer surplus
is denoted by (S + P)t or (S + P)s if the regulator announces the tax rate
or the subsidy rate, respectively. We ¯nd that



























The sum of consumer and producer surplus is larger, if the regulator an-
nounces s¤ instead of t¤, if and only if
(S + P)s ¡ (S + P)t > 0 ()
(2
p
5 ¡ 1)(1 ¡ c)2
40b
> 0, (90)
which always holds, thus establishing the second part.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose tk = 1¡c
















1 g = ¼
KK
1 , (91)






33must hold (See (52)).
HUP implies
W2 > W0 (93)




1 ) > 2K (95)




W noreg;0 denotes the social welfare, if no ¯rm has invested and no regulation
is introduced.































which leads to the contradiction 48 < 45. Therefore s¤ implies I1 = I2 = K.
7.6 Proof of Lemma 1





tax revenues from the second ¯rm. The only critical deviation to be checked
is
p1 = c + t ¡ ", 0 < " << 1. (102)
34Then the ¯rst ¯rm would capture the whole market, but would not receive
any taxes from the second ¯rm. Deviating yields the net pro¯t
¦1 = (t ¡ ")N(c + t ¡ ") ¡ K (103)
of the ¯rst ¯rm, which is less than in equilibrium as long as
tN(c + t) ¸ (t ¡ ")N(c + t ¡ ") (104)
or equivalent if
(p ¡ c)N(p) ¸ (p ¡ c ¡ ")N(p ¡ "): (105)
Condition (105) is ful¯lled for all p 2 [c;pm], since (p ¡ c)N(p) is monotoni-
cally increasing in p for all p 2 [c;pm]. Therefore, condition (104) is ful¯lled
for all t 2 [0;pm ¡ c].
Note that due to our tie-breaking rule, the second ¯rm will stay in the
market.
7.7 Proof of Lemma 2






p1 ¡ " if p1 > c
p1 if p1 = c
> c else
. (106)
In the ¯rst case (p1 > c), the second ¯rm undercuts p1 to obtain the total
demand and thus to avoid taxation, since t = minfsannN1;maxf¦¤
2;0gg=N2
becomes zero due to N1 = 0. Accordingly, we have s = 0. The second
¯rm chooses p2 = p1 if the ¯rst ¯rm chooses the price c (second case). The
subsidy rate s = minfsann;maxf
¦¤
2
N1;0gg becomes zero again, since ¦¤
2 = 0.
The tie-breaking rule ensures that the second ¯rm does not exit. In the latter
case (p1 < c), the second ¯rm o®ers a price higher than c to avoid ¦2 < 0:
Again we have s = 0. To sum up, the implemented subsidy rate s is always
zero.
357.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Suppose the regulator announces the tax rate t close to pm ¡ c. Then
K < tN(c + t). (107)




0 if I2 = K
K else . (108)
In the ¯rst case (I2 = K), ¯rm 1 does not invest, since no investment yields
a net pro¯t of zero instead of ¡K. In the latter case (I2 = 0), ¯rm 1 invests
to ensure a positive net pro¯t instead of a net pro¯t of zero, which illustrates
the ¯rst part.
The second part of proposition 8 follows from lemma 2, since no invest-
ment yields a net pro¯t of zero instead of ¡K, which is the pro¯t per ¯rm if
both ¯rms have invested.
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